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A B S T R A C T
The EU goals for renewable electricity cause significant changes of electrical loads in distribution systems, in
which most renewable electricity sources are integrated. This poses a challenge for distribution system operators
(DSOs) as their networks are not designed for such load changes. DSOs could use networks more efficiently with
demand side management (DSM), where consumers of electricity alter their consumption patterns, shifting
(production/consumption) loads in the distribution system. In such a setting, consumers would trade DSM
services with the DSOs. However, currently, DSOs follow the ‘copper plate approach’, which assumes the system
should have sufficient capacity to ensure that the desired volumes of electricity can be transported. This seeks to
guarantee regulated third party access (rTPA) for all system users. Next to rTPA, based on regulated tasks, DSOs
should ensure secure, reliable and efficient systems. In doing so, the DSOs are bound by unbundling require-
ments, which do not allow them to be involved in any activities other than those related to distribution.
Therefore, especially production and supply are not allowed. Still, it seems debatable whether EU law allows
DSOs to apply DSM, as it has an impact on both the access conditions to the electricity system, and the pro-
duction, supply and trade of electricity. This article further analyses how DSM relates to the legal framework of
DSOs, which obstacles are present, and how DSM could be traded between DSOs and system users.
1. Introduction
When studying energy law, a number of principles can be identified.
Heffron et al. for example identified seven principles in energy law:
national resource sovereignty, access to modern energy services, energy
justice, prudent, rational and sustainable use of natural resources,
protection of the environment, human health and combatting climate
change, energy security and reliability, and resilience (Heffron et al.,
2018). When translating these principles to electricity systems, they
should be: secure, reliable, resilient, accessible upon affordable condi-
tions, and with a fair cost-distribution between its users, which is fit for
the integration of clean energy sources. However, there might be ten-
sion between the different principles. Especially the use of (renewable)
energy sources can have a significant impact on the costs and reliability
of the existing electricity system. In order to understand this impact,
this article first analyses the policy regarding the integration of re-
newable energy sources in EU electricity systems, and how that impacts
the security, reliability, and resilience of such systems, increasing the
tension in the ‘energy trilemma’ in electricity distribution systems. The
energy trilemma refers to the balance between affordability, reliability
and sustainability of energy systems, and the idea that affordability,
reliability and sustainability are (potentially) conflicting interests (see
e.g. Heffron and Talus, 2016a, p. 201). Following, the article proposes
how the impact could be managed, and analyses how such ‘manage-
ment’ relates to EU energy law, especially on the access conditions for
the electricity system. In doing so, the implementation of the relevant
EU law in the Netherlands is used as a case study, to assess the legal
questions in more detail.
2. EU renewables policy and system impact
The EU climate policy goals set by the roadmap for climate stability
strive for an almost carbon-free (80%) EU energy system by 2050
(European Commission, 2011), which in turn are also implemented in
EU law. The most prominent EU law in this regard is the Renewables
Directive (Renewables Directive, 2009), in which an overall policy for
the production and promotion of energy from renewable sources in the
EU is established and EU Member States (MSs) are required to realize
challenging targets for the implementation of renewables in the current
electricity system (arts. 3 and Annex I (A) Renewables Directive).
Consequently, large amounts of renewable electricity sources (RES) are
integrated into EU electricity system.
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Although the RES targets aim at positive outcomes they also raise
concerns on the ability of the current electricity network to deal with
peak loads at distribution level. This intermittency of RES creates issues
regarding the amount and schedule of power consumption and pro-
duction (Kuiken et al., 2018). In addition to the increasing peak loads
and intermittency caused by distributed RES there is an increasing
demand for electricity at distribution level. This is mainly caused by the
electrification of mobility (electric vehicles) and heat (heat pumps) and
it causes similar issues to the ones from distributed RES. These issues
are likely to cause system problems such as voltage level violations
(over or under voltage) and power congestions. In turn, these may lead
to increased network losses, shortened lifespan of network equipment,
damage to end-user equipment, interrupted supply services, or, in the
worst case, network outages. It becomes clear that risks of efficiency
losses, system outages, and damage to both network equipment and
electrical devices are likely to rise, potentially increasing costs for both
system operators (SOs) and consumers. This is particularly a reality in
distribution systems, which usually are the point of connection for
small to medium scale RES (Ecorys, 2014).
2.2. Demand-side management
Although the issues described could be tackled by increasing the
physical capacity of the electricity systems (e.g. thicker cables, heavier
transformers etc.), these are expected to be quite significant (CE Delft,
2017). Alternatively, DSOs could try to allocate the existing network
capacity more efficiently by applying demand side management (DSM).
DSM refers to all actions aiming at changing electricity load profiles for
optimization of the power system as a whole, from generation to de-
livery to end-use. It improves power efficiency and optimises resources
allocation so a more efficient use of electricity can be achieved
(Gellings, 2009). Yet, if the DSO would be applying DSM, such an ac-
tivity should be assessed in light of the applicable rules on distribution
system operation.
2.3. Distribution system operator and system access
The Electricity Directive (E-Directive) (Electricity Directive, 2009)
requires that DSOs are independent from production and supply ac-
tivities, defines the tasks a DSO should perform as well as how such
should be performed. Additionally, the E-Directive establishes a system
of regulated Third Party Access (rTPA), which requires DSOs to provide
all (potential) system users (SUs) with access to the electricity system
upon published tariffs, applicable to every customer, and applied ob-
jectively and without discrimination between system users. All these
requirements seek to ensure a level playing field for producers/sup-
pliers to access the electricity system to trade electricity, and for con-
sumers to get access upon transparent and comparable conditions.
However, if DSOs would apply DSM, a number of consequences
would follow. First, by applying DSM instead of increasing network
capacity the DSO might need to refuse access to the electricity system to
some users (see further Section 4). Second, by applying DSM the DSO
influences consumption patterns. Such influence in turn also impacts
production, supply, and trade of electricity. To evaluate these con-
sequences, and assess whether they are permissible, this article analyses
the role of the DSO, based on its regulated tasks, and how the use of
DSM by the DSO interacts with the relevant regulatory framework.
Further, this article assesses which instruments can be used for in-
tegrating DSM in system operation and how these relate to the reg-
ulatory framework. Provided that EU law mostly offers general gui-
dance on how unbundling, regulated tasks for DSOs, and rTPA should
be ensured, this article includes an analysis of the Dutch implementa-
tion of these requirements (Electricity Act, 1998), hereafter E-Act. The
choice for the Dutch implementation is based on the form of
unbundling adopted in the Netherlands: ownership unbundling. Be-
cause this is the most extensive form of unbundling (for further back-
ground see Chapter 3, Johnston and Block, 2012), this analysis is ex-
pected to allow for a clear view of the eminent issues related to the
implementation of DSM by DSOs given the strict requirements on se-
paration of distribution, production, and supply.
3. Regulation of distribution system operators
In order to understand how DSM could be applied in the EU, and, as
a case study, in the Netherlands, it is first of all important to understand
in which (regulated) setting DSM should be implemented. As explained
in the introduction, DSOs are independent from production and supply
activities. This is a consequence from the liberalization of the EU
electricity markets in which distribution and production/supply must
be unbundled activities. In this setting, production and supply are
market activities, whilst distribution is a regulated activity, reserved for
DSOs. This means that DSOs have a regulated monopoly, with the ob-
ligation to provide system services to all potential customers. The set-
tings of such services are regulated in terms of price and quality. These
determine the conditions under which the DSO's customers, SUs
– which can be both consumers and producers/suppliers – can access
the electricity system. The obligation for DSOs to provide system ser-
vices under regulated conditions is linked to a (regulated) right for SUs
to access (rTPA) the electricity system. To further unravel how the
regulation of DSOs is shaped and what rTPA entails, this section ex-
plains how unbundling, the tasks of the DSO, and rTPA are regulated in
EU law, and how these regulations have been implemented in the E-Act
and relevant delegated legislation.
3.1. Unbundling
The concept of unbundling is understood as requiring (previously)
‘vertically integrated’ companies (a firm which performs activities
ranging from production to distribution) to be ‘unbundled’ into a dis-
tribution and production and/or supply company (Treacy et al., 2013,
p. 61). The E-Directive requires DSOs to be at least legally independent
from vertically integrated undertakings (art. 26 E-Directive) to avoid
any possible conflict of interest between system operation, and pro-
duction and supply. To ensure the requirement is fulfilled, SOs must
function independently from producers and suppliers, and operate in a
transparent manner. More specifically, DSOs should be at least in-
dependent in ‘its legal form, organization and decision making from
other activities not relating to distribution’ (art. 26(1) E-Directive;
Johnston and Block, 2012). This means that DSOs may remain in joint
ownership with suppliers or producers, but may not be involved in
operation, decision making, funding etc. or any other activity than
distributing electricity (art. 26(2) E-Directive). In the Netherlands,
unbundling goes beyond the minimum requirements of the E-Directive:
the E-Act requires DSOs to be ownership unbundled. In other words,
DSOs should be fully separated from production and supply companies
(art. 10b E-Act).
3.2. Regulated DSO tasks
The general task of the DSO is to ensure:
“the long-term ability of the system to meet reasonable demands
for the distribution of electricity, for operating, maintaining and
developing under economic conditions a secure, reliable and
efficient electricity distribution system […] with due regard for the
environment and energy efficiency. [emphasis added]” (art. 25(1)
E-Directive).
In this definition, ‘the system’ refers to the ‘distribution system’,
used to transport electricity ‘with a view to its delivery to customers’
(art. 2(5)-(6) E-Directive). It should be operated, maintained and
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developed under ‘economic conditions’ as well as be ‘secure, reliable
and efficient’. Whilst the term ‘economic conditions’ generally refers to
market-based conditions and mechanisms (recital 35, 36 and 56 E-
Directive), ‘secure, reliable and efficient’ refer to a wider set of re-
quirements. For example, ‘secure’ could refer to both technical security
and security of supply. In fact, both are defined within EU legislation.
Security of supply is defined in the E-Directive (e.g. recital 25 and 44)
and Directive 2005/89/EC as the ability of the system to supply cus-
tomers with electricity as well as the continuous operation of the system
itself (Directive, 2005/89/EC, 2006). System security and reliability are
further defined in technical standards (arts. 37(1)(h) and (q) E-Direc-
tive; Regulation (EC) 714/2009, 2009). Although these are designed by
and for TSOs, they also pose requirements on DSOs, seeking to ensure
that distribution systems contribute to secure and reliable transmission
systems.
Next to secure and reliable, as mentioned above the system should
also be ‘efficient’, which can refer to both economic and environmental
efficiency. This is especially so when reading ‘efficiency’ in relation
with ‘economic conditions’ or ‘due regard for the environment and
energy efficiency’. We argue that ‘efficiency’ means both economic,
environmental, and energy efficiency. In this context, energy efficiency
should be interpreted as the ratio of input of energy versus the output,
the performance (art. 2(4) Directive, 2012/27/EU, 2012, hereafter
Energy Efficiency Directive). Still, interpreting ‘with due regard to the
environment’ as environmental efficiency, it is unclear what would be
the difference between ‘with due regard to the environment’ and with
due regard to energy efficiency’.
Whilst environmental efficiency seems to encompass a broader
concept, as it relates to the efficient ‘use’ of the environment, e.g. the
use of natural resources versus the effects of such usage on the en-
vironment, energy efficiency seems to be more restricted and fall under
the requirement of environmental efficiency; energy supply requires
natural resources, and the efficiency with which these are used can be
translated into environmental efficiency. Adding to this ambiguity, it
should be noted that ‘energy efficiency’ is not included in the general
tasks of the TSO (only with ‘due regard to the environment’, see art.
12(a) E-Directive, see further European Council, 2008; European
Parliament, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c), implying that ‘due regard for energy
efficiency’ would be a specific requirement for DSOs. Yet, when con-
sidering e.g. the Energy Efficiency Directive, both are clearly required
to include energy efficiency in their system operations (e.g. art. 15(1)
Energy Efficiency Directive). Also in terms of effects, there does not
seem to be a clear reason why both requirements are specifically dis-
tinguished for the DSO. As such, we assume that both point in the same
direction.
Still, when considering the general requirement of ‘efficiency’,
economic and environmental efficiency do not necessarily point in the
same direction; there can be tension between these two. In order to
promote environmental efficiency, investments might be necessary.
Whilst these investments are made in short-term, the gains might only
become visible on the long-term. To assess the efficiency of such in-
vestments, both long and short-term costs and benefits should be con-
sidered. If the long-term (negative external) effects are not properly
linked to the short-term investments, some investments might not be
considered economic efficient, because the positive effects of e.g. en-
ergy efficiency are not integrated in the economic efficiency assess-
ment. Yet, for this article we assume that if all external costs are
properly integrated into the electricity system, both economic and en-
vironmental efficiency can be optimized in short-term (For further
background see Rentizelas and Georgakellos, 2014; Streimikiene and
Alisauskaite-Seskiene, 2014).
In the Netherlands, the E-Act mostly echoes the provisions of the E-
Directive (art. 16(1) E-Act). Nonetheless, it is worth highlighting that
the E-Act stresses the importance of the network to be managed in ‘the
most efficient manner’. Also here, the term could refer to both economic
and environmental energy efficiency. If considering the latter
interpretation, it can be argued that the DSO should deploy flexibility
up to the extent to which it improves energy efficiency, even if based on
current methods and methodologies for calculating tariffs it would not
lead to increased economic efficiency. Although this could be a relevant
point for debate when future legislation is concerned, for the moment,
throughout the E-Act and its subsidiary legislations, ‘efficiency’ mostly
implies economic efficiency (for more background see Mulder, 2016).
Reading the regulated tasks of the DSO in conjunction with the provi-
sions on remuneration for system operation, these provisions prescribe
that the network tariffs are (also) assessed on ‘the most efficient quality
of transportation’ (distribution), and the efficiency of business man-
agement (arts. 41 and 41a E-Act; Kleinhout, 2015). When further
analysing the tasks of the DSO, these are to take into account measures
in the field of renewable electricity, energy savings, demand response,
or decentral electricity production to prevent the need for replacing or
expanding production capacity, when constructing, restoring, renewing
or expanding their networks (art. 16(1)(c) E-Act). When striking a
balance between (short-term) economic and energy efficiency, it seems
that based on the current regulatory setting the DSO should strive for
economic efficiency, but can also justify measures that increase energy
efficiency. This ability to include such measures depends on the exact
regulation of the DSOs’ remuneration schemes (tariffs), and for instance
the determination of which effects can be included in the efficiency
assessment, and which time-frames should be used for such assess-
ments.
More specific requirements for system operation can be found in the
electricity codes (arts. 36 and 26b E-Act). While the E-Act provides the
general framework on how the electricity should be operated and how
DSOs and SUs should interact, the network codes provide the specific
requirements and conditions for DSO-SU interactions. The network
codes also form the foundation for the ‘connection and transport
agreement’ (CTA) which is established between the DSO and its SUs,
and the general terms and conditions applicable to this agreement.
3.3. Regulated third party access
The electricity system must be secure, reliable and efficient. This is a
precondition for a high quality electricity system that can be used upon
reasonable conditions, such as at reasonable costs. However, for SUs to
actually make use of such a system, they must also be able to access
such a system. In this context, access not only means having a physical
connection, but also the ability to use the system. The E-Directive grants
all (potential) SUs the right to use the electricity system, in which a
physical connection is a precondition (arts. 3(3) and 32 E-Directive;
ECJ, 2007). Nevertheless, MSs are free to adopt any system that ensures
TPA in an objective and non-discriminatory manner (ECJ, 2007, para.
47). Still, the right to access is not an absolute right. SOs may refuse
access in cases where there is insufficient capacity in the network.
Nonetheless, in such cases duly substantiated reasons must be given,
based on objective, technical and economic criteria (art. 32(2) E-Di-
rective). In addition, rTPA does not require access to be provided under
the same conditions to all SUs. Conditions must simply be non-dis-
criminatory, meaning that only SUs in the same user class should have
the same access conditions (Kruimer, 2011). In order to ensure that
access conditions are comparable, connection and transport fees must
be ‘based on published tariffs’, and ‘applied objectively and without
discrimination between system users’. The methodologies used by the
SOs to define such tariffs are regulated by the National Regulatory
Authority (NRA) (arts. 32(1) and 37(6)–(7) E-Directive).
In the Netherlands, rTPA has been implemented in line with the
requirements of the E-Directive (arts. 23(1) and 24(1) E-Act). Based on
these, the DSO must offer a ‘connection and transport agreement’ to any
party that wishes to enter into an agreement with the DSO. A SO can
only refuse access in case of lack of capacity (art. 24(2) E-Act).
However, if this occurs, the SO should take measures to avoid future
refusals (if possible). If refusals threaten to become structural, or in
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other words, if demand for capacity structurally exceeds available ca-
pacity, that is referred to as ‘congestion’ (Definition Code, 2016). In
case of congestion, the SO has to ensure that the capacity issues are
solved (see further Section 4.4).
4. Demand side management
As mentioned in the introduction, DSOs have two options for en-
suring safe and reliable networks: ensuring network capacity up to peak
demand or DSM. The current approach of DSOs is largely based on the
first option, also known as the ‘copper plate approach’, in which vir-
tually any desired transfer of electricity between market parties can be
performed. As such, it relies on the assumption that the flow of elec-
tricity is not restricted by physical constraints (Pfluger, 2014). When
ensuring this constraint-free electricity system, the DSO serves as a
market facilitator for the electricity production and supply markets. In
this setting, the DSO is able to ensure rTPA and the unbundling re-
quirements. Whilst allowing all SUs to access the system, the DSO is not
participating in production or supply in any way; it is simply ensuring
sufficient capacity. Nevertheless, this approach might not be the most
efficient one in future scenarios of increasing amounts of RES.
The alternative, DSM, has a different focus. Whilst still ensuring
security and reliability, it emphasizes efficiency. Sufficient capacity can
still be realized via DSM, nonetheless, this capacity should not be based
on peak-demand, rather, on a more equally spread load. Yet, DSM does
not come without obstacles. It can only work if DSM is able to offer a
more efficient alternative than network expansion. DSM also creates
scarcity of network capacity, at least at some moments in time (peak-
moments) which does not necessarily facilitate the (wholesale) pro-
duction and supply markets (at national and EU level), or at least could
reduce the efficiency of production facilities because of network con-
straints. Still, although the DSO would not facilitate production and
supply markets, it might facilitate the market for flexibility, by creating
demand for DSM (flexibility).
In the following subsections, we assess how DSM is defined in law
and could be utilized by the DSO; if the DSO could use DSM for system
operation and still act in line with the unbundling requirements; how
the use of DSM would relate to the regulated tasks of the DSO; and how
it would relate to the current regulation of system operation.
4.1. Definition and utilization
In the E-Directive, DSM is defined as:
“[…]influencing the amount and timing of electricity consump-
tion in order to reduce primary energy consumption and peak loads
by giving precedence to investments in energy efficiency measures,
or other measures, such as interruptible supply contracts, over in-
vestments to increase generation capacity, if the former are the
most effective and economical option, taking into account the
positive environmental impact of reduced energy consumption and
the security of supply and distribution cost […]” (art. 2(29) E-
Directive).
This definition suggests that DSM could be used to increase the ef-
ficiency and security of distribution systems (notice the terms marked
in bold). Moreover, in order ‘to combat climate change’ and ensure
security of supply, MSs are even required to implement, among other
options, DSM for network maintenance (art. 3(10) E-Directive). The E-
Directive also encourages DSOs, for example, to use DSM to lower de-
mand for electricity capacity (art. 25(7) E-Directive). The term ‘elec-
tricity capacity’ is not defined in this context. Yet, it could mean both
network capacity and generation capacity (‘reducing primary energy
consumption and peak loads’). For instance, by using DSM, network
losses could be reduced and so the need for generation. In this sense,
DSOs could use DSM to increase network efficiency to lower network
losses. In the Netherlands, this approach seems to be the one adopted.
In the E-Act, ‘electricity capacity’ has been defined as ‘production ca-
pacity’ (art. 16(1)(c) E-Act). Still, this interpretation raises questions as
to whether it is permissible for a DSO to use DSM to influence pro-
duction and supply. In this light, it is relevant to assess how influencing
production and supply relates to the unbundling requirements.
4.2. Compatibility with unbundling
According to the unbundling requirements (see Section 2.1), DSOs
are not allowed to be involved in activities other than system operation.
Nevertheless, whilst using DSM is perfectly in line with the goals of
system operation (to ensure secure, reliable and efficient systems), the
application of DSM also influences production and supply markets. By
re-organizing the amount of active power in a specific time-slot, the
conditions for production and supply markets are changed. As such,
when using flexibility, the DSO is actively influencing the market for
electricity production, supply, and trade. Consequently, in this context
the actions of the DSO also impact the demand and supply of electricity,
and ultimately, the market price of electricity. In assessing whether this
‘influence’ is allowed, the object, purpose, and exact wording of the
unbundling requirements come into play. The object and purpose have
been described in the above sections: to facilitate a level playing field
for the production, supply, and trade market by ensuring transparent
and non-discriminatory access to the system and being independent
from production, supply, and trade. Such influence does not oppose to
the object or the purpose since, if the playing field is changed, it is
changed on a similar way to allmarket parties. Neither is influence over
the electricity market prohibited for the DSO by the wording of the E-
Act (see Section 3.1). This is also demonstrated by the obligation for
DSOs to purchase electricity for compensating network losses (art.
3.1.2(b) Tariff Code, 2016). This obligation renders the DSOs into the
largest electricity consumers in the electricity market. Because the DSOs
are the only parties able to reduce demand for electricity based on
network losses it seems inevitable that they influence the market for
production, supply, and trade of electricity.
Linking the use of DSM by the DSO to the role of the DSO as a
neutral market facilitator also provokes the question of how should the
DSO behave in its role of market facilitator. Therefore, the next sub-
section assesses how the DSO could or should act to facilitate ‘the
(flexibility) market’.
4.3. Market facilitation
The DSO can facilitate the market for DSM in multiple ways. One is
to ‘create’ scarcity of network capacity by not expanding existing in-
frastructure when needed. In this setting, the DSO could use (reward)
DSM to avoid congestion. However, when scarcity in network capacity
exists, there is a demand for (local) flexibility, DSM. As such, the value
of the latter increases, and assuming a well-functioning market in which
scarcity is identifiable to SUs, the incentive for investments in DSM also
increases. Nevertheless, another important side effect might come into
play: if DSM is used to avoid network expansion, electricity might get
‘locked’ in lower system levels, reducing the mobility of electricity and
flexibility. Consequently, potentially large quantities of flexibility
could, in theory, be used on other system levels, yet, cannot be trans-
ported to these levels. Alternatively to applying DSM, the DSO could
ensure sufficient capacity with the goal to allow flexibility to be easily
transported through the system. The latter basically maintains the
copper plate, whilst the first takes a fundamentally different stand.
Arguably, the latter seems perfect, as it could serve the production and
supply markets as well as the flexibility markets. Still, it reduces the
efficiency of the electricity system (Nykamp, 2013). This brings to
question the balancing of security, reliability and efficiency, and the
assurance of access to SUs up to ‘reasonable’ demand.
The above balancing question seems solvable by providing clear and
proper market incentives on local levels. For example, by translating
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the costs made in a specific area to the SUs connected in that area, the
SUs can either opt for DSM, lowering their demand for (peak) network
capacity and avoiding an increase in their network tariffs, or refuse
DSM by not lowering their demand for capacity (voluntarily), and in
turn leading to capacity expansion, and an increase in network tariffs.
The trade-off for SUs here would be based on a number of factors, such
as the willingness and ability to provide DSM, hence, invest in DSM.
Additionally, the DSO plays an important role in providing incentives,
e.g. by proposing a clear and transparent market in which the value of
flexibility is clear to SUs, and to inform SUs about the long-term con-
sequences of e.g. network expansions versus DSM. Notably, the trade-
off can be very difficult as the value of flexibility is not only based on
local conditions, but also on the demand in other system levels, e.g. the
market for balancing capacity at transmission level, which has a much
higher liquidity.
Nevertheless, regardless of the ability and willingness of SUs, at the
moment, the current tariff-setting methods render such incentives al-
most impossible. Currently, transport tariffs in the Netherlands are
based on the actual peak (of used capacity) for a period of one month
(kWmax), on the contracted peak (for capacity usage) (kWcontracted), on
the amount of transported electricity (use of capacity, expressed in
kWh), or simply on the physical capacity of the connection (kW) (art.
3.7 Tariff Code). The exact composition (and amount) of the tariffs is
based on which type of SU is considered. In the Tariff Code, SUs are
classified on the basis of their connected system level (e.g. 230/400 V,
to which most household customers are connected), though their exact
location is irrelevant for the amount of their tariffs. System costs are
socialized amongst classes of SUs, regardless of their location. If local
incentives ought to be included in the current tariffs, the tariff-setting
methods need to be amended. Yet, it seems questionable whether such
local incentives would be allowed from an EU law perspective. The E-
Directive defines small customers as one user class and prescribes that
MSs should take measures to protect customers in remote areas, which
are commonly faced with higher infrastructure costs due to low popu-
lation densities (art. 3(3) and (7) E-Directive). This implies solidarity
amongst small customers, which makes it difficult to allow for different
treatments of small customers.
Still, assuming local incentives can be included in DSM schemes
applied by the DSO, other potential obstacles can be found in rTPA.
When applying DSM, the DSO allocates (part of) its available (scarce)
capacity in a specific part of its system. Regardless of whether capacity
is scarce, the DSO will alter the access conditions for (some) SUs.
Currently, the DSO must avoid putting in use capacity allocation me-
chanisms. Consequently, the applicable regulatory framework does not
provide for capacity allocation as modus operandi for DSOs.
4.4. Capacity allocation as modus operandi
In the current regulatory framework that applies to DSOs, these are
expected to ensure sufficient capacity in order to avoid refusals of ac-
cess (art. 24(2) E-Act). In practise, it means that the DSO will ensure
capacity up to peak demand, plus some overcapacity to avoid future
capacity issues. Nevertheless, although the DSO avoids capacity scarcity
as much as possible, in some occasions demand for capacity can rise
rapidly. For example, if a SU makes significant changes to its installa-
tion, or decides to install significant amounts of PVs, demand for ca-
pacity can rise rapidly. In such a situation, the DSO will increase ca-
pacity. Yet, it might be unable to do so in a short term. For these cases,
the DSO will have to allocate the available capacity. This type of ‘ca-
pacity allocation’ is referred to as ‘congestion management’ (for ana-
logy with cross-border congestion see, for example, Vedder et al.,
2016).
In the Netherlands, congestion management is defined as a set of
measures to solve a situation in which network capacity is insufficient
to provide access under all foreseeable circumstances (Definitions Code,
2016). This is to be performed according to a fixed protocol, described
in the Netcode (Netcode, 2016). First, the DSO must release an an-
nouncement, stating at least the expected area, duration, and cause of
the congestion. Also, the total contracted and available transport ca-
pacity in the expected congestion area and plans for avoiding future
congestion must be stated. After the announcement, the DSO assesses
whether sufficient flexibility is available to solve the congestion. If this
seems to be the case, the DSO can request SUs to provide bids for DSM
services. If such a request does not result in sufficient bids, the DSO can
pose requirements on its SUs for making available flexibility to solve
the congestion (art. 4.2.5 Netcode). Yet, the above described ‘conges-
tion management’ does not seem to offer a fitting solution for long-term
capacity allocation by the DSO. This is because, if there is a congestion,
it should be dealt with and prevented in the future. As such, from the
perspective of the congestion management setting fixed by the Netcode,
scarcity seems to be inadmissible.
Nevertheless, the fact that the congestion management mechanism
cannot be used does not preclude capacity allocation as a whole. Based
on the regulatory tasks of the DSO, it seems permissible (or even de-
sirable) to perform capacity allocation to increase the efficiency of the
electricity system (see Sections 3.2 and 4.1). On the other side, the
reason for the congestion management scheme to be in place is to en-
sure rTPA: to avoid refusals of access by the DSO (art. 24(2) E-Act) and
to avoid system security and reliability issues in period between the
identification of congestion and the capacity expansion solving the
congestion. The follow-up question, therefore, seems to be what qua-
lifies as a refusal of access, or perhaps, what qualifies as access; should
that be access up to all desired demand, regardless of the consequences
(costs), or can such access be limited? Moreover, if such access can be
limited, who decides ‘how much’ capacity each SU should receive, and
are all SUs in comparable user-classes entitled to the same amount of
capacity? In order to assess these questions, we identify two options the
DSO can apply. The first is voluntary allocation, in which the DSO in-
vites SUs to lower their demand, using a market based mechanism to
allocate the available capacity. In this setting, SUs are free to make a
bid. If sufficient SUs are willing to lower their demand for capacity, not
all SUs have to be flexible. It can be compared to the invitation the DSO
sends according to the congestion management procedures. The second
option is involuntary allocation, in which the DSO caps the physical
capacity and SUs can access this capacity based on their willingness to
pay. In this setting, all SUs have to bid for capacity
With voluntary allocation, SUs collectively have the freedom to
decide whether or not to accept higher network tariffs to participate in
DSM. However, two issues exist: the first is that SUs are addressed as
collective when it comes to network tariffs. It is already mentioned
above that the current division of classes does not allow for local in-
centives. Yet, if such local incentives could be provided, it remains
difficult to assess how capacity issues are influenced. In other words, it
is difficult to define the extent to which SUs are able to actually decide
on whether they prefer investing in capacity expansion (higher network
tariffs) or DSM. For individual SUs to assess whether they are willing to
invest in DSM, they require clarity on the demand for DSM; they should
be able to assess whether such an investment would be profitable. If the
decision to invest is e.g. based on local market conditions (i.a. DSO
demand for DSM for a specific system level), the business case might
change drastically if DSM does not provide sufficient capacity reduction
to tackle congestions. Then the DSO would rather invest in capacity
expansions, increasing the general network tariffs, but lowering the
(local) demand for flexibility. This would drastically change the ‘busi-
ness-case’ for SUs to invest in DSM. Also the certainty related to the
investment in DSM might be too low to persuade SUs to actually make
investments based on local conditions. This seems a difficult problem
from a coordination perspective. However, from a rTPA perspective
voluntary allocation seems less difficult to assess. If SUs are willing to
reduce their use of the electricity system at agreed terms and condi-
tions, it seems difficult to argue a violation of the rTPA requirements.
Yet, if the DSO and the SU would agree on the terms and conditions for
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refusal, hence, the terms and conditions for access, with the current
interpretation of rTPA, access would still be provided ‘as desired’ by
SUs.
An alternative to voluntary allocation would be involuntary allo-
cation. Currently, this is governed by the congestion management
scheme described above. Even without the de jura application of such a
scheme, e.g., by allocating without congestion, or allocating with
congestion on the long term, it is questionable whether rTPA would
allow for this allocation. In all these settings, the DSO decides whether
scarcity should be allowed and whether and how DSM should be ap-
plied. Besides, all settings would result in situations in which the DSO
can refuse access based on insufficient capacity or to increase effi-
ciency. Nevertheless, in the current regulatory setting, rTPA does not
allow for such refusals.
In addition, it is questionable whether involuntary allocation allows
the DSO to perform its role as a market facilitator. Using flexibility to
avoid capacity expansions and focussing on local network issues (hence,
efficiency) also reduces the overall mobility of electricity within that
area. In the case a distribution system is operating close to its capacity
limits, flexibility cannot be transferred to other (higher) system levels –
assuming flexibility is required in the ‘same direction’ (either increase
or decrease of production or consumption) – since the capacity to do so
might be lacking. In such situations, the flexibility is ‘trapped’ in one
region, whilst it might be needed in other ones. Consequently, these
reductions might well lower the overall efficiency of the electricity
system as a whole (ACM, 2017). From an SU perspective, it also limits
the trade options, as their flexibility might not be deliverable to some
market parties, located in other parts of the system. However, in this
setting a transport-bottleneck will always exist somewhere. The ques-
tion is when and where these are allowed. This also touches upon a
more general policy discussion that underpins this article: to which
extent should we maintain the copper plate approach? In the end, this
requires striking a balance between meeting reasonable demands for
capacity (ensuring rTPA) and efficiency. To do so, a transparent me-
chanism should be developed to assess when capacity needs to be ex-
panded and when it should be capped and (re)allocated (for further
background see Gómez, 2013).
5. Agreement forms
The above sections question whether DSOs can integrate DSM in
their system operation in the light of the current legal framework.
Assuming a clear and transparent method can be found to apply DSM,
and capacity still is extended if demanded, the answer is affirmative.
However, the next question is how DSOs could acquire the required
DSM services from its system users. The answer lies in different types of
trade forms which are or could be applied between DSOs and their
system users. For instance, the CTA (see Section 3.2) could be used for
integrating flexibility into the system operation. Another option would
be to use dedicated DSM agreements between SUs (or a service provider
on their behalf) and the DSO, in which they agree on the terms for DSM.
Such agreements can be standardized, tailor made, or framework
agreements, which set terms for ongoing trade. Dedicated DSM agree-
ments can also be channelled through a trading platform in which
flexibility is traded via clearing houses (spot markets). Flexibility could
also be traded by using existing market platforms, such as power ex-
changes (PXs). Yet, current PXs do not take local conditions into con-
sideration. As an example, the Dutch EPEX Spot does not allow for local
(distribution) elements to be taken into account (EPEX Spot, 2017a,
2017b). As such, PXs cannot be used for direct trading of flexibility
between DSOs and SUs. Yet, a service provider could act as an inter-
mediate between DSOs and system users, taking into account local
conditions, and arranging for the flexibility to be integrated in the PX
via regular electricity trade. In this scenario, flexibility would be ex-
changed indirectly via the PX and the relevant agreement for the trade
between the DSO and the system users would be the service agreement,
with the service provider acting as an intermediate.
In order to further explore the general potential of the above de-
scribed arrangements for trading DSM between SUs and DSOs, we first
focus on the CTA. Thereafter, we consider the dedicated DSM agree-
ments that can be used alternatively or in addition to the CTA.
5.1. Connection and transport agreement
At first sight, the CTA seems highly suitable for trading DSM ser-
vices between the DSO and SUs. The main reason is that this agreement
exists between every individual SU and its connecting DSO. The CTA
includes the terms and conditions for the physical connection to the
distribution system and the transport services required for using the
connection. Although this agreement could be very suitable for in-
tegrating flexibility into system operation, provided that the financial
terms of the CTA are set in the Tariff Code, currently the CTA cannot be
used for such purposes (see Sections 4.3 and 4.4 and Ouden et al.,
2016).
In order to allow DSM to be integrated into the CTA, the Tariff Code
needs to be amended. The Tariff Code should allow for a ‘flexibility
component’ to be included. This component should account for the time
of usage. A practical way of including such a component is by attaching
a profile to each CTA, in which, for each moment in time, the maximum
(or desired) consumption or production is stated in order for the DSO to
optimize the efficiency of the available capacity. If SUs are unable to
adhere to such a profile, they need to buy bandwidth, which would
allow them to move away from the profile. As an alternative to in-
cluding a flexibility component, the CTA could also be turned into a
model, comparable to the current supply agreement model (see art.
95na E-Act). In the Netherlands, consumers have the right to a regu-
lated model supply agreement, but are free to have any other agreement
with their supplier. This setting could also be applied to the CTA. Yet,
having different types of CTAs and using different methods and meth-
odologies for calculating tariffs would make it difficult (but certainly
not impossible) to ensure non-discriminatory and transparent condi-
tions for the CTA (art. 95 m(1) E-Act). It would require the DSO to have
models, or at least methods, for ensuring that similar SUs are tariffed at
a similar (non-discriminatory) and transparent manner. This also re-
quires the NRA (Authoriteit Consument en Markt – ACM) to be involved
in setting the tariffs structures and creating legal certainty for both the
DSO and system users (arts. 32–43 Electricity Act). However, as men-
tioned, before the CTA could include flexibility, the current Tariff Code
needs to be amended.
5.2. Dedicated DSM agreement
Alternatively to the CTA, dedicated forms – such as (bilateral) DSM
agreements or (DSM) market platforms – could be used. Both would
have the same purpose: in this case, trading DSM services between the
DSO and SU (or service providers on their behalf, see e.g., USEF, 2015).
Nevertheless, despite their common purpose, considerable differences
exist. When using bilateral DSM agreements, e.g., ancillary service
contracts (see Eid et al., 2016; Lanz et al., 2011; Mäntysaari, 2015), SUs
could trade directly with the DSO (for further background see Ramos
et al., 2016). Although these agreements can be standardized, they offer
plenty of room for tailor made conditions. A possible downside of bi-
lateral DSM agreements is that they are less transparent, making it more
difficult to relate them to the CTA and the rTPA requirements (see
Sections 4 and 5.1). When using market platforms, DSOs and SUs in-
teract via a platform, in which both parties make a bid, typically ex-
pressed in the quantity of ‘service’ they desire, the quality (type of
service, normally standardized), and the price they are willing to buy or
sell that quantity of a specific service (for more details also see Koliou,
2016). In the end, the market price is set and the market is cleared by
the market operator (clearing house). In this indirect form of trade, the
advantages are that the conditions are clear in advance, the platforms
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are easy to use, and the financial risks of the trading parties are lower.
In general, selling parties have to deliver to the clearing house (who is
responsible for making their payments), and the clearing house has to
deliver to the buying parties (which pay the clearing house). If one of
the parties is in default, the clearing house has to bear the risk, at least
in first instance (also see, Ranci and Cervigni, 2013). Nevertheless, this
reduced risk has a price which is integrated into the service costs of the
clearing house. Furthermore, trading platforms mostly use standardized
services. Although standardized services make all bids more compar-
able, they might restrict competition by using service definitions that
are too narrow, e.g., excluding demand and supply from the platform
(for further background, Telyas, 2014). In this case, a solution could be
to ensure that the market operator regularly has an open season to
define the scope and breadth of services.
6. Conclusion and policy implications
This article looks into the tension between some of the energy law
principles (see Introduction and further Heffron et al., 2018) translated
to electricity systems in relation to the EU renewable and sustainability
energy policy. More specifically, this article focusses on the energy
trilemma – the tension between affordability, reliability and sustain-
ability in electricity distribution systems – and how energy law can be
used to regulate an acceptable balance in it (Heffron and Talus, 2016a).
In this context, although rTPA and unbundling are important regulatory
measures in EU energy law that impact price and quality of electricity
distribution services, it might be that these cause the tensions between
the elements of the energy trilemma to rise. For this reason the article
analyses how such tensions (and their consequences) could be miti-
gated in electricity distribution systems by means of integration of DSM
in system management (small customers). This requires connecting the
different principles, and analysing how they interact, which tensions
exist between them, and how energy law can mitigate such tensions
(Heffron and Talus, 2016b).
As a general conclusion of this article it can be stated that DSM
offers chances for the DSO to add to a fair balance in the energy tri-
lemma by optimizing the performance of its regulated tasks, ensuring
the security, reliability, and efficiency of the electricity system. Yet, the
integration of DSM into the DSO's system operation does not come
without challenges. Whilst the use of DSM by the DSO does not seem to
conflict with the unbundling requirements and seems to be an adequate
tool for optimizing the performance of the regulated tasks of the DSO,
the current interpretation of rTPA clearly restricts its use. In tackling
such restrictions, two options can be identified: 1) stick to the existing
interpretation and look for leeway; 2) opt for an alternative inter-
pretation of rTPA, hence, the concept of ‘access’. In either scenario,
careful decisions have to be made regarding how the DSO could in-
tegrate DSM into its system operation. In order to make such decisions,
also the role of the DSO needs to be considered; how can the DSO act as
a neutral facilitator? Currently, this role is mainly seen as market fa-
cilitator, in which the DSO has to ensure a copper plate to comply with
its regulatory tasks. However, in a scenario in which DSM is utilized, a
different interpretation could be given to the role of market facilitator.
In such an interpretation, ‘market’ does not necessarily mean ‘produc-
tion and supply market’, it could also mean ‘market for flexibility’.
Following the question which role the DSO would have to play
would be what the users of the electricity system prefer. This is a so-
cietal question, which can approached on a central (national) level, or
on a local (distribution system) level. This question is a difficult ques-
tion to answer, especially considering the local variaties in distribution
systems and their connected users. Some system users would be willing
and able to provide DSM, others not. In any setting applying DSM, there
will be a reallocation of system costs, those providing DSM paying less
(but having to compensate their investments in flexible equipment),
those not providing DSM having to compensate the reduction in costs
for the DSM providers. This redistribution influences the accessibility of
consumers to the electricity system, potentially quite significantly. In
relation to the legal framework, it relates to how rTPA is implemented,
i.a. how system tariffmethodologies are designed (costs are distributed)
and integrated into the CTA. This balancing question, how to safeguard
the different interests, especially reliability of the system and afford-
ability for system users, needs to be addressed and the answers should
be used to fine-tune the current legal framework.
In sum, DSM is a promising tool for optimizing system efficiency,
increasing the overall affordability of the electricity system, and en-
suring sustainability. Yet, in order to harvest the promises of DSM and
integrate DSM into system operation and the relevant laws regulating
such operation, a number of policy questions need to be addressed first.
Most prominently, it should be considered how we want to approach
system access. Is this a given right that should be facilitated up to every
desired level, regardless of the consequences, and based on socialization
to level-out the most inefficient costs? Or would an approach in which
the users of the electricity system are given incentives to contribute to
(the overall) system efficiency be more desirable? In addition, the role
of the DSO should be considered; should the DSO simply follow capa-
city demands, or should it also steer for the highest possible efficiency
rates of capacity usage at distribution level, perhaps transmission, or
even EU level? All these questions relate to the energy trilemma, and
more specifically the principles mentioned in the introduction: security,
reliability, resilience, efficiency, the environment, and the accessibility
of the electricity system to its customers. How important are all these
principles, and how should the balance be made if conflicting interests
exist? Once these questions have been properly addressed in the light of
DSM utilization by the DSO, the legal framework analysed in this article
could be redesigned (fine-tuned) into an enabler for DSM, contributing
to a more efficient electricity system.
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